Instantie

Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens

Samenvatting

Het hanteren van een tijdslimiet voor de echtgenoot om zijn vaderschap
te ontkennen is gerechtvaardigd vanwege de rechtzekerheid en de bescherming
van de belangen van het kind. Het hanteren van een tijdslimiet voor de moeder
(en het kind) is minder noodzakelijk aangezien de belangen van de moeder
gewoonlijk samenvallen met die van het kind. .

Verzoeker, Rasmussen, is een Deens staatsburger die in 1966 is getrouwd.
Het echtpaar krijgt in 1966 een zoon en in 1971 een dochter. Hoewel de man
meteen twijfelt of hij wel de verwekker van zijn dochter is, onderneemt hij
geen stappen om zijn vaderschap te ontkennen omdat hij zijn huwelijk wil
redden. In 1973 start het echtpaar een echtscheidingsprocedure. Aanvankelijk
wordt afgesproken dat de man niet zal proberen zijn vaderschap te ontkennen,
terwijl de vrouw geen beroep zal doen op levensonderhoud voor het kind. De
vrouw komt op deze afspraak terug en daarop begint de man toch een procedure
ontkenning vaderschap.

Op grond van de Deense wet uit 1960 moet een echtgenoot een procedure
tot ontkenning van vaderschap binnen 12 maanden instellen nadat hij kennis
heeft genomen van omstandigheden die een grond tot ontkenning zouden kunnen
opleveren en niet later dan vijf jaar na de geboorte van het kind. Alleen als
er een zeer bijzondere reden is waardoor deze termijn is overschreden, kan de
man alsnog verlof krijgen om te procederen. Het kind mag daarvan geen groot
nadeel ondervinden. Volgens de wet geldt geen tijdslimiet voor de moeder om
een ontkenningsactie te beginnen.

Het verzoek van de man wordt in 1976 niet ontvankelijk verklaard. In
1978 probeert hij het opnieuw. De moeder verweert zich door te stellen dat het
kind nadeel zal ondervinden. Opnieuw wordt het verzoek van de man, ook in
hoger beroep, niet ontvankelijk verklaard.

Op 21 mei 1979 wendt de man zich tot de Europese Commissie (no.
8777/79). Hij beroept zich op discriminatie op grond van sekse, omdat voor
zijn ex-vrouw geen tijdslimiet geldt om het vaderschap aan te vechten. De
Commissie oordeelt in 1983 dat er sprake is van schending van art. 14 jo art.
8 EVRM en legt de zaak voor aan het Europese Hof.

Volledige tekst

Het Hof

(..)

II. Was there a difference of treatment?

34. Under the 1960 Act, the husband, unlike the child, its guardian or
the mother, had to institute paternity proceedings within prescribed
time-limits.

The Government pointed out that this difference which appeared on the
face of the Act was reduced in scope by two factors: firstly, it was open to
the husband to seek leave from the Court of Appeal to institute proceedings
out of time; secondly, not only the husband but also the mother might be
debarred from contesting paternity by virtue of the ‘doctrine of
acknowledgement’. However, the Government did not suggest that these factors
were sufficient to eliminate the difference laid down by statute. Indeed, the
mother would not, like the husband, be estopped solely for being out of time;
her action might simply fail as a result of her previous attitude.

For the purpose of Article 14, the Court accordingly finds that there
was a difference of treatment as between Mr. Rasmussen and his former wife as
regards the possibility of instituting proceedings to contest the former’s
paternity. There is no call to determine on what ground this difference was
based, the list of grounds appearing in Article 14 not being exhaustive.

III. Were the applicant and his former wife placed in analogous
situations?

35. Article 14 safeguards individuals who are ‘placed in analogous
situations’ against discriminatory differences of treatment.

36. The Government supported the conclusion of the minority of the
Commission that husband and wife were not placed in analogous situations as
far as a paternity suit was concerned, there being a number of distinguishing
characteristics between their respective positions and interests. The majority
of the Commission, on the other hand, found that those characteristics were
not sufficiently fundamental to warrant that conclusion.

37. The Court does not consider that it has to resolve this issue,
especially as the positions and interests referred to are also of relevance in
determining whether the difference of treatment was justified. It will proceed
on the assumption that the difference was made between persons placed in
analogous situations.

IV. Did the difference of treatment have an objective and reasonable
justification?

38. For the purposes of Article 14, a difference of treatment is
discriminatory if it ‘has no objective and reasonable justification’, that is,
if it does not pursue a ‘legitimate aim’ or if there is not a ‘reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought
to be realised’.

39. The Government pleaded that the limited difference of treatment that
existed had an objective and reasonable justification. They relied, inter
alia, on the following points:

(i) the respective interests of the husband and of the mother in
paternity proceedings were different: unlike the husband’s interests, the
mother’s generally coincided with those of the child; and it was natural that,
in weighing the interests of the different family members, the Danish
legislature should in 1960 have taken the view that the interests of the
weaker party, namely the child, should prevail;

(ii) the legislature had also regarded it as necessary to lay down
time-limits for the institution of paternity proceedings by a husband because
of the risk that he might use them as a threat against the mother, in order to
escape maintenance obligations;

(iii) in deciding whether the national authorities have acted within the
‘margin of appreciation’ which they enjoy in this area, regard should be had
to the economic and social circumstances prevailing at the relevant time in
the country concerned and to the background to the legislation in question;

(iv) Denmark had undoubtedly amended the 1960 Act when this proved to be
warranted by subsequent developments, but it could not be said that the former
Danish legislation on this matter was at the relevant time less progressive
than that of the other Contracting Parties to the Convention.

The Commission found that the only legitimate purpose for the difference
of treatment complained of by the applicant was the desire to avoid the
child’s being placed in a worse position by the institution of paternity
proceedings several years after its birth. However, since this aim could have
been achieved through the ‘doctrine of acknowledgement’, there was no
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed – the
laying-down of time-limits solely for the husband – and the aim sought to be
realised.

40. The court has pointed out in several judgments that the Contracting
States enjoy a certain ‘margin of appreciation’ in assessing whether and to
what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different
treatment in law. The scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according
to the circumstances, the subject-matter and its background; in this respect,
one of the relevant factors may be the existence or non- existence of common
ground between the laws of the Contracting States.

41. Examination of the Contracting States’ legislation regarding
paternity proceedings shows that there is no such common ground and that in
most of them the position of the mother and that of the husband are regulated
in different ways.

The Danish legislation complained of was based on recommendations made,
after a careful study of the problem, by the Paternity Committee set up by the
Ministry of Justice in 1949. The Court has had close regard to the
circumstances and the general background and has borne in mind the margin of
appreciation which must be allowed to the authorities in the matter. In its
view, they were entitled to think that the introduction of time-limits for the
institution of paternity proceedings was justified by the desire to ensure
legal certainty and to protect the interests of the child. In this respect,
the legislation complained of did not differ subsantially from that of most
other Contracting States or from that currently in force in Denmark. The
difference of treatment established on this point between husbands and wives
was based on the notion that such time-limits were less necessary for wives
than for husbands since the mother’s interests usually coincides with those of
the child, she being awarded custody in most cases of divorce or separation.
The rules in force were modified by the Danisch Parliament in 1982 because it
considered that the thinking underlying the 1960 Act was no longer consistent
with the developments in society; it cannot be inferred from this that the
manner in which it had evalutated the situation twenty-two years earlier was
not tenable.

It is true that an equivalent result might have been obtained through
the ‘doctrine of acknowledgement’, but, for the reasons already indicated, the
competent authorities were entitled to think that as regards the husband the
aim sought to be realised would be most satisfactorily achieved by the
enactment of a statutory rule, whereas as regards the mother it was sufficient
to leave the matter to be decided by the courts on a case-by-case basis.
Accordingly, having regard to their margin of appreciation, the authorities
also did not transgress the principle of proportionality.

42. The Court thus concludes that the difference of treatment complained
of was not discriminatory, within the meaning of Article 14 and that there has
been no violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8.

Rechters

Mrs. Wiarda, Ganshof van der Meersch, Bindschedler- Robert, Matscher,Macdonald, Russo, Gersing