Instantie

Europese commissie voor de rechten van de mens

Samenvatting

In oktober en november 1992 doen D en W aangifte van verkrachting door
Slobodan bij de politie. In november 1992 doen de dochter en de ex-vrouw
van
Slobodan aangifte van seksueel misbruik van hun dochter. De ex-vrouw
verklaart dat zij tijdens het huwelijk regelmatig werd mishandeld door
haar
ex-man en dat zij haar toevlucht had gezocht samen met hun dochter bij
een
Blijf-vanmijn-Lijf huis.
Op 11 november 1992 is de ex-vrouw gehoord bij de rechter-commissaris.
De
advocaat van de verdachte besloot daarbij niet aanwezig te zijn. Op 28
januari 1993 zijn de ex-vrouw en hun dochter in aanwezigheid van verdachtes
advocaat door de rechter-commissaris gehoord.
Ondanks verschillende verzoeken, is het de verdachte niet gelukt een kopie
van het vonnis van de rechtbank Zwolle te bemachtigen. De rechtbank heeft
de
verdachte vrijgesproken van de twee beschuldigingen van verkrachting en
veroordeeld voor seksueel misbruik van zijn dochter. Zowel verdachte als
het
OM zijn in hoger beroep gegaan.
De veroordeling is gebaseerd op de verklaring van zijn dochter bij de
rechter-commissaris en een psychiatrisch rapport over zijn dochter.
Tijdens het hoger beroep is W gehoord, in afwezigheid van de verdachte.
Hoewel zijn advocaat in staat was vragen te stellen aan W, besloot het
hof om
de andere drie slachtoffers niet te horen op de zitting omdat deze al door
de
rechter-commissaris waren gehoord en de advocaat had daar de gelegenheid
gehad om vragen te stellen. Het hof veroordeelde de verdachte voor de
verkrachtingen van D en W en voor het seksueel misbruik van zijn dochter
tot
een gevangenisstraf van drie jaar.
Het cassatieberoep van verdachte werd afgewezen op 4 april 1995.

Volledige tekst

De verdachte klaagt:
1. dat hij onterecht is veroordeeld voor mishandeling;
2. omdat hij onterecht is veroordeeld, hij onterecht gedetineerd is geweest;
3. dat het hof zijn verzoek om drie getuigen te horen niet heeft gehonoreerd,
en dat hij niet aanwezig mocht zijn bij het verhoor van W.
4. dat artikel 14 EVRM is geschonden.
Deze zaak is een voortzetting van de jurisprudentie in de zaken
Baegen (RN 1996, nr. 628) en Doorson over het
beschermingsregime met betrekking tot getuigenverhoor.THE FACTS

The applicant is a Dutch citizen, born in 1938 in Yugoslavia, and residing
in
Zwolle. Before the Commission he is not represented by a lawyer.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised
as
follows.

In October and November 1992 Ms. D. and Ms. W. informed the police that
they
had been raped by the applicant. Also in November 1992 the applicant’s
former
wife and his daughter informed the police that the latter had been sexually
abused by him. In her statement the applicant’s former wife stated that
during their marriage she had been ill-treated by the applicant and that
she
had fled to a reception centre for battered women with her daughter whom
she
thought to have been sexually abused by the applicant.

On 11 November 1992 Ms. D. was heard by the Investigating Judge
(Rechter-Commissaris) of the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank)
of
Zwolle. The applicant’s lawyer had been informed of the time and place
of the
hearing of Ms. D. but he chose not to attend. On 28 January 1993 the
applicant’s former wife and his daughter were heard by the Investigating
Judge in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer.

In spite of various requests the applicant has failed to submit a copy
of the
judgment of the Regional Court of Zwolle. However, it appears from the
file
that on 11 May 1993 the Regional Court acquitted the applicant of both
counts
of rape and convicted him of having sexually abused his daughter and that
both the applicant and the public prosecutor filed an appeal against this
judgment with the Court of Appeal. It further appears that the applicant’s
conviction by the Regional Court was based on, inter alia, the testimony
of
his daughter before the Investigating Judge and a psychiatrist’s report
concerning the daughter.

At the subsequent hearing on appeal before the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof)
of Arnhem on 17 December 1993 the alleged rape victim Ms. W. was heard
in the
absence of the applicant. However, the applicant’s defence counsel was
able
to put questions to Ms. W. The Court of Appeal did not call the three other
witnesses (the second alleged rape victim Ms. D., the applicant’s former
wife
and his daughter), despite a request from the applicant. The Court of Appeal
held that these witnesses had already been heard by the Investigating Judge
and recalled that the applicant’s defence counsel had been granted the
opportunity to put questions to these witnesses. It considered that the
applicant could not reasonably be held to have been prejudiced in his defence
by the refusal to summon the witnesses.

In its judgment of 29 December 1993, the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment
of the Regional Court and, after a new examination of the facts and evidence,
convicted the applicant of all charges and sentenced him to a partially
suspended term of three years’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeal used the
following in evidence against the applicant:

– a statement of the alleged rape victim Ms. W. to the police and her
statement given before the Court of Appeal;
– a statement of the alleged rape victim Ms. D. to the police and her
statement before the Investigating Judge;
– a statement of a neighbour of the applicant to the police;
– various statements of the applicant to the police;
– a statement of the applicant at the hearing before the Regional Court;
– a statement of the applicant’s former wife to the police;
– a statement of the applicant’s daughter to the police;
– the birth-certificate of the applicant’s daughter; and
– a statement of a police officer.

The applicant filed an appeal in cassation against this decision with the
Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). He complained, inter alia, that the Court of
Appeal had not allowed the examination of three witnesses (his former wife,
his daughter and one of the alleged rape victims) and that the Court of
Appeal had also not allowed him to attend the Court’s examination of the
second alleged rape victim.

The Supreme Court rejected the appeal in cassation on 4 April 1995.

Relevant domestic law and practice

Section 292 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering)
enables the President of a Court to order an accused to leave the courtroom
so that a witness may be examined in the absence of the accused. If such
an
order is made, counsel for the defence may question the witness and the
accused shall be told immediately what has happened during his absence
and
only then will the investigation be resumed.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains under Article 3 of the Convention that his
wrongful conviction amounted to ill-treatment.

2. He further complains under Article 5 of the Convention that since he
was
wrongfully convicted his detention is unlawful.

3. The applicant also complains under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d) of the
Convention that the Court of Appeal failed to summon three witnesses. In
addition, he complains that he had not been allowed to attend the Court
of
Appeal’s examination of a further witness.

4. Finally, he invokes Article 14 of the Convention without further
substantiation.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains that his wrongful conviction amounted to treatment
contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment
or
punishment.”

The Commission recalls that it is no court of appeal from domestic courts.
It
cannot examine allegations that the domestic courts incorrectly assessed
the
facts before them or incorrectly applied domestic law. The Commission is,
therefore, unable to determine whether or not the applicant was wrongfully
convicted.

Consequently, the Commission finds that this part of the application is
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 of the
Convention.

2. The applicant further complains under Article 5 of the Convention that
his
detention is unlawful.

Article 5 para. 1 of the Convention reads, insofar as relevant, as follows:

“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall
be
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with
a
procedure prescribed by law:

(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
…”

The Commission refers to its reasoning concerning the complaint under Article
3 of the Convention above. Furthermore, there is nothing in the present
case
which could warrant the conclusion that the applicant was not convicted
by a
competent court.

Accordingly, the Commission finds that this part of the application is
also
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, para. 2 of the
Convention.

3. The applicant further complains that the Court of Appeal failed to summon
his former wife, his daughter and one of the alleged rape victims as
witnesses. He also complains that he was not allowed to attend the Court
of
Appeal’s examination of the second alleged rape victim. He invokes Article
6
paras. 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, which, insofar as relevant, provide
as
follows:

“1. In the determination … of any criminal charge against him, everyone
is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
…
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum
rights:
…
d. to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him; …”

The Commission recalls from the outset that the taking of evidence is
governed primarily by the rules of domestic law and it is in principle
for
the national courts to assess the evidence before them. It is therefore
not
the Commission’s task to decide whether the national courts have correctly
assessed the evidence, but to determine whether the proceedings as a whole,
including the way in which evidence was taken, were fair as required by
Article 6 para. 1 (cf. Eur. Court HR, Kostovski v. the Netherlands judgment
of 20 November 1989, Series A no. 166, p. 19, para. 39.)

Also, Article 6 para. 3 (d) of the Convention does not give an accused
an
unlimited right to obtain the examination of witnesses. It is in principle
within the discretionary power of domestic courts to establish whether
the
hearing of witnesses is likely to be of assistance for discovering the
truth
and, if not, to refuse the calling of such witnesses (cf. Eur. Court HR,
Bricmont v. France judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 158, p. 31, para.
89).

Furthermore, the Commission reiterates that the Convention does not preclude
reliance on statements obtained at the stage of the police inquiry and
the
judicial investigation, provided that the rights of the defence have been
respected. As a rule these rights require that the defendant be given an
adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against
him either when he was making his statements or at a later stage of the
proceedings (cf. Eur. Court HR, Saïdi v. France judgment of 20 September
1993, Series A no. 261-C, p. 56, para. 43).

As to the notion of “witness”, the Commission notes that although the
applicant’s former wife, his daughter and the alleged rape victim Ms. D.
did
not testify at the hearing, they should for the purposes of Article 6 para.
3
(d) of the Convention, be regarded as a witness – a term to be given its
autonomous interpretation – because their statements, as taken down by
the
police and the investigating judge, were used in evidence by the Court
of
Appeal (cf. Eur. Court HR, Asch v. Austria judgment of 26 April 1991, Series
A no. 203, p. 10, para. 25).

The Commission, moreover, has had regard to the Court’s judgment in the
case
of Doorson v. the Netherlands (Eur. Court HR, judgment of 26 March 1996,
to
be published in Reports 1996) in which it is considered that Article 6
of the
Convention does not explicitly require the interests of witnesses in general,
and those of victims called upon to testify in particular, to be taken
into
consideration but that, however, their life, liberty or security of person
may be at stake, as may interests coming generally within the ambit of
Article 8 of the Convention. Such interests of witnesses and victims are
in
principle protected by other, substantive provisions of the Convention,
which
imply that the Contracting States should organise their criminal proceedings
in such a way that those interests are not unjustifiably imperilled. Against
this background, principles of fair trial also require that in appropriate
cases the interests of the defence are balanced against those of witnesses
or
victims called upon to testify (op. cit., para. 70).

In addition, the Commission has previously held that criminal proceedings
concerning rape contain special features in that they are often conceived
of
as an ordeal by the victim, in particular when the latter is unwillingly
confronted with the defendant. In the assessment of the question whether
or
not in such proceedings an accused received a fair trial, account must
be
taken of the right to respect for the victim’s private life. The Commission
has accepted that in criminal proceedings concerning sexual abuse certain
measures may be taken for the purpose of protecting the victim, provided
that
such measures can be reconciled with an adequate and effective exercise
of
the rights of defence (cf. Baegen v. the Netherlands, Comm. Rep. 20.10.1994,
para. 77, Eur. Court HR, Series A no. 327-B, p. 44).

In the present case the Commission notes that the applicant’s former wife
and
his daughter were heard by an Investigating Judge in the presence of the
applicant’s defence counsel. The Commission observes, furthermore, that
it
has not been submitted by the applicant that his defence counsel was unable
to put questions to the above mentioned witnesses. Moreover, counsel was
enabled to attend the hearing by the Investigating Judge of the alleged
rape
victim Ms. D. but he chose not to do so.

The Commission observes that the Court of Appeal refused to accede to the
applicant’s request to summon the three witnesses since they had already
been
heard by the Investigating Judge and the applicant’s defence counsel had
then
been given the opportunity to question the witnesses. For this reason the
Court of Appeal found that its refusal to summon the witnesses could not
be
considered prejudicial to the applicant’s defence. The Commission finds
that
in the circumstances of the present case the refusal to summon the three
witnesses does not appear to be unreasonable or arbitrary. Moreover, the
Commission considers that, although the applicant’s former wife did not
allege to be a victim, special circumstances existed which justified the
decision not to confront her with the applicant during the trial. In this
respect the Commission recalls that she had alleged having been ill-treated
by the applicant during their marriage as a result of which she had fled
to a
reception centre for battered women with her daughter whom she thought
to
have been sexually abused by the applicant.

As regards the applicant’s complaint that he was not allowed to attend
the
Court of Appeal’s examination of the alleged rape victim Ms. W., the
Commission observes that the applicant’s defence counsel was allowed to
question this witness at the hearing before the Court of Appeal.

Furthermore, it does not appear that, in the course of the criminal
proceedings against him, during which he was represented throughout, the
applicant had no opportunity to challenge the witnesses’ versions of the
events, could not properly challenge their reliability, or could not
challenge the other evidence against him.

In these circumstances the Commission is of the opinion that the criminal
proceedings against the applicant, considered as a whole, cannot be regarded
as unfair.

It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 of the Convention.

4. The applicant finally complains under Article 14 of the Convention.

The applicant has failed to substantiate this complaint. The Commission
considers that the circumstances of the present case do not disclose any
appearance of a violation of this right under the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Noot

In de uitspraak in de zaak Slobodan stelt de ECRM nogmaals het regime vast
met betrekking tot het getuigenverhoor, zoals dat is ontwikkeld in de zaken
Baegen en Finkensieper (EHRM 27 oktober 1995, series
A,
nr. 327-B, RN 1996, 628; ECRM 30 november 1994, nr. 19525/92, resp. ECRM
17
mei 1995, RN 1996, 627). Anders dan door de raadsman bepleit kan de verdachte
aan art. 6 lid 3 EVRM geen ongelimiteerd recht ontlenen tot het horen van
getuigen. De verdragsbepaling biedt geen grondslag voor concrete, afdwingbare
rechten, maar fungeert op overkoepelend niveau als een zorgvuldigheidstoets.
Anders gezegd: art. 6 EVRM bevat een open normstelling, waaraan de nationale
bepalingen inzake de inrichting van het strafproces moeten voldoen. De
organisatie en toepassing van het nationale strafprocesrecht is daarbij
voorbehouden aan de nationale wetgever, respectievelijk de strafrechter.
Uit de jurisprudentie van de Commissie en het Europese Hof is inmiddels
duidelijk geworden dat de inrichting van het getuigenverhoor onder
omstandigheden afhankelijk kán zijn van de aanspraken welke getuigen als
rechtsburgers kunnen ontlenen aan art. 8 EVRM (zie laatstelijk: EHRM 23
april
1997, NJ 1997, 635, Van Mechelen). Van belang is voorts de aanwijzing van
art. 8 EVRM als primaire basis voor bijzondere getuigenbescherming in het
kader van het strafproces. Vastgesteld wordt dat art. 8 EVRM in beginsel
autonome aanspraken bevat op bescherming van de privésfeer. Het open karakter
van art. 6 EVRM staat vervolgens toe een verbinding te leggen tussen
aanspraken ontleend aan de twee onderscheiden bepalingen. Indien deze
belangen conflicteren is het de taak van de strafrechter een afweging te
maken tussen de autonome belangen van de (slachtoffer)getuige en het recht
van de verdachte op een eerlijk proces ex art. 6 EVRM. Het is dus niet
zo dat
art. 6 lid 3 EVRM een hogere status zou hebben dan art. 8 EVRM; ook het
omgekeerde is niet het geval (zie: A. Beijer, Bedreigde getuigen in het
strafproces, Deventer, 1997, hoofdstuk 8; Beijer wijst daarnaast op art.
2
EVRM als grondslag van getuigenbescherming).
Deze horizontale werking van grondrechten roept, zoals de praktijk heeft
geleerd, onvermijdelijk vragen op naar de invulling van art. 6 lid 3 onder
d
EVRM. De commissie stelt uitdrukkelijk vast er geen sprake is van een
absoluut, ‘ongelimiteerd’ recht van de verdachte op ondervraging van
(slachtoffer)getuigen. Tevens stelt zij nogmaals uitdrukkelijk vast dat,
gelet op de belangen van de (slachtoffer)getuigen in beginsel kan worden
volstaan met getuigenverklaringen afgelegd ten overstaan van de politie
of
rechter-commissaris op voorwaarde dat de belangen van de verdachte afdoende
zijn gewaarborgd.
Met het oog daarop geeft de commissie, gelijk zij deed in de zaken
Baegen en Doorson (EHRM 26 maart 1996, NJ 1996, 741)
een (dwingende) aanwijzing aan de lidstaten om te komen tot strafprocessuele
voorzieningen ter bescherming van (slachtoffer)getuigen.
Naast een bevestiging van bestaande jurisprudentie voegt de uitspraak van
de
commissie in de zaak Slobodan ook iets nieuws toe. Ik doel op het onderscheid
dat de commissie maakt tussen slachtoffers en getuigen. De commissie doet
dat
op twee plaatsen. De eerste maal in een overweging aangaande de verhouding
art. 6 jo. 8 EVRM (pag. 5: ‘Such interests of witnesses and victims (…).’).
De tweede maal meer concreet aan het eind van de uitspraak. Overwogen wordt
dat ook een getuige die zich niet als slachtoffer profileert aanspraken
kan
maken op een strafprocessueel beschermingsregime, mits de omstandigheden
daartoe aanleiding geven. In dit geval biedt het feit dat de betreffende
getuige – de ex-echtgenote – langdurig is mishandeld door de verdachte,
voldoende grond om haar buiten aanwezigheid van verdachte te verhoren.
De
wens van deze getuige om geen strafvervolging in te stellen wegens de
mishandeling wordt gerespecteerd (pag.6: ‘The applicant’s former wife did
not
allege to be a victim.’), maar staat een erkenning van haar kwetsbare positie
naar verdachte toe niet in de weg.
Op het eerste gezicht lijkt deze overweging niets nieuws toe te voegen
aan de
bestaande situatie: strafprocessuele bescherming van getuigen is immers
niet
beperkt tot slachtoffers. Desondanks meen ik dat de Commissie hier een
zekere
nuancering aanbrengt, in die zin dat het belang dat ten grondslag ligt
aan
het toekennen van getuigenbescherming een andere is dan gebruikelijk. In
de
regel wordt het bijzondere verhoorregime immers beperkt tot slachtoffers,
dan
wel tot getuigen wiens anonimiteit justitie wenst te waarborgen (A.M. van
Hoorn, De wet getuigenbescherming. Een uitzonderlijke regeling, RU
eiden, Leiden, 1996). In dit geval is daarvan geen sprake, het gaat hier
om
een bekende getuige wiens slachtofferstatus in beginsel buiten de grondslag
van de tenlastelegging valt. Desondanks wordt de feitelijke
slachtofferervaring meegewogen in de vraag of deze getuige aanspraak kan
maken op een bijzonder verhoorregime en in het verlengde daarvan of het
recht
van de verdachte op een eerlijk proces is gerespecteerd. Daarmee lijkt
het
belang dat de Commissie hecht aan art. 8 EVRM in relatie tot art. 6 lid
3
onder d EVRM wat te zijn toegenomen.

Renée Kool

Rechters

Mrs Thune, Geus, Jörundsson, Gözübüyür, Soyer, Damelius, Martinez, Nowicki,Cabral Barreto, Mucha, Svaby, Lorenzen, Bizliunas, Alkema